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INTRODUCTION

he United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the

Third Circuit's decision in Forum for Academic and InstitutionalReform
(F.A.I.R) v. Rumsfeld. 1 This ongoing litigation is challenging the constitu-

tionality of the Solomon Amendment, 2 which requires the department of
defense to withhold federal funding from institutions of higher education
if they restrict military recruitment on campus. 3 Before addressing the validity of the Solomon Amendment itself, it is important to assess the
source of federal authority for the underlying federal spending program
to which the conditions of the Solomon Amendment are attached. The
several public and private universities who have challenged the Solomon
Amendment in FA.I.R. litigation all receive federal funds in support of
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, and Director, The
Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence. Dr. Eastman is
counsel of record for The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence, amicus curiae in support of petitioners in Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic and Institutional Reform, No. 04-1152 (U.S., pending). He wishes to
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Eli Whitus, Harvard Law School Class of
2006, for research and drafting assistance with the brief, on which this article is
based.
1. 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 1977 (U.S. May 2, 2005)
(No. 04-1152).
2. See id. at 228-29 (explaining current litigation).
3. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2004) ("No funds [as described by this statute] ...
may be provided by contract or by grant to an institution of higher education.., if
the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution ... has a policy or practice ...that either prohibits, or in effect prevents ...access to campuses... for the
purposes of military recruiting[.]"). The funds that are withheld are those that are
made available to a wide range of Departments, including funds from the Department of Defense, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation and Education. See id. § 983(d) (listing funds made unavailable).
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their educational efforts-funds conditioned on compliance with the Solomon Amendment.
The Constitution contains no enumerated power delegating to the
federal government specific authority over education. Additionally, federal funding for education does not fall within Congress's broad powerproperly understood-to tax and spend for the general welfare, 4 as the
grants to particular local or state institutions are primarily for local, rather
than national, benefit. Neither is the underlying federal spending program at issue here a valid exercise of Congress's near-plenary power over
federal territory, 5 as none of the institutions involved in this litigation are
in the District of Columbia or other federal territories.
Rather, the most solid footing for federal financial grants to local institutions of higher education appears to be the power delegated to Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution "[t]o raise and support
Armies," 6 combined with the Article I, Section 8 power afforded to Congress to adopt means that are both "necessary and proper" to effect the
enumerated ends. 7 While the breadth of federal spending on education
may well press the limits of even these powers as originally understood, at
least some measure of federal spending for local institutions of higher
learning is constitutionally permissible when directly tied to Congress's efforts to raise and support Armies. The Solomon Amendment provides
that necessary nexus; it would be odd, therefore, for the very condition
which renders federal spending permissible to be unconstitutional. Further, it is well and correctly established that conditions on federal spending designed to ensure compliance with the permissible ends of spending
programs do not intrude upon constitutionally-protected speech and association rights.
II.

THE ORIGINAL SPENDING CLAUSE

As originally conceived, Congress's power to spend for the general
welfare was limited to spending for national, as opposed to merely local or
regional, concerns. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts,
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."8 On its face, the
4. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the Power to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 ("[Congress shall have the power] [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of
Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States ... .
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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Clause allows Congress to levy taxes only for two purposes: 1) to pay the
debts of the United States and 2) to provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States. To the modern eye, however, those
two purposes are so broad as to amount to no limitation at all. Indeed, the
contemporary view is that the power to provide for the "general welfare"
grants Congress the ability to spend for anything it views as beneficial in
some way, even if beneficial only to a small segment of the population or
9
to a single locale.
Such was not the view of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution, nor the view which prevailed in the political branches of government
for the first half century of our nation's history, nor the view which prevailed in this Court until after its New Deal-era decision in United States v.
Butler.10 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson held the limited view that
the power to spend for the "general welfare" only authorized Congress to
spend to further the other powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8.11
Alexander Hamilton viewed the Clause more expansively, but still believed
it only authorized spending for the national welfare rather than local welfare. 1 2 Justice Story agreed with Madison and Hamilton on this limitation
on the Spending Clause, writing:
[a] power to lay taxes for the common defence and general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general
power.... [I]f the welfare be not general, but special, or local, as
contradistinguished from national, it is not within the scope of
13
the constitution.
From 1800 to 1860, almost every president adhered to the view that
the Spending Clause was limited, either by its own text or by the enumeration of powers which followed. In the closing days of his second term as
9. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REv.
89, 93 (2001) (noting that "[i]t is hard to imagine a broader statement of the
scope of Congress's power" than "common [d]efence" and "general [w] elfare" language of Spending Clause).
10. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
11. See, e.g., 3 ANNALS OF CONG., 362, 386-87 (1792) (presenting James
Madison, Debate on the Cod Fishery Bill, warning Congress about generally defined spending power); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 416, 418

(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (stating that without such limit on "general welfare" clause, Congress would have "power to do whatever would be for the good of
the United States; and .... it would be also a power to do whatever evil they
please"); THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 263-64 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (interpreting Congress's power to spend for "general welfare" as authorizing
only that spending aimed at achieving specifically enumerated powers of Article 1,
Section 8).
12. See, e.g., Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in 2 FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 446, 446-47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (describing founders' intent).
13.

JOSEPH STORY,

2

COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED

STATES § 919, at 382 (1833).
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President, for example, Madison vetoed an internal improvements bill
that would have funded the construction of roads and canals "in order to
facilitate, promote, and give security to internal commerce among the several States, and to render more easy and less expensive the means and
provisions for the common defence."1 4 Madison rejected the contention
that the Spending Clause authorized such expenditures, stating that such
a broad reading would render "the special and careful enumeration of
powers, which follow the clause, nugatory and improper."1 5 President
James Monroe vetoed as unconstitutional a bill to preserve and repair the
Cumberland Road, noting in his veto message that Congress's power to
spend was restricted "to purposes of common defence, and of general, not
1 6
local, national, not State, benefit."
President Andrew Jackson vetoed as unconstitutional an effort by
Congress to improve navigation of the Wabash River. 1 7 He conceded that
the improvements in the navigable portions of the river qualified as "general" or national welfare, but he deemed improvements above the point of
navigability to be unconstitutional appropriations for local improvements
rather than improvements in the general welfare.1 8 Presidents Tyler, Polk
and Buchanan likewise vetoed internal improvements bills as unconstitutional exercises of Congress's power under the Spending Clause. 19 President Buchanan took it as a given that the spending of funds raised by
Congress from taxation was limited to "certain, precise, and specific objects" in accordance with the execution of the enumerated powers delegated to Congress. 2 0 The idea that the resources of the federal
government-either taxes or public lands-could be diverted to carry into
effect any measure of state domestic policy that Congress saw fit to
support:
would be to confer upon Congress a vast and irresponsible authority, utterly at war with the well known jealousy of federal
power which prevailed at the formation of the Constitution. The

14. 30

ANNALS OF CONG.

211, 211 (1817).

15. Id. at 212.
16. 46 ANNALS OF CONG. 1838, 1849 (1822).
17. See 28 H.R. JOuRNAL 9, 27-32 (1834) (recording President Andrew Jackson's veto message on "An act to improve the navigation of the Wabash river").
18. See id. (stating that act to improve navigation of Wabash River goes too far
by prescribing unnecessary improvements that border on extravagance).
19. See, e.g.,
55 H.R. JOURNAL 501, 505-08 (1859) (recording President James
Buchanan's veto message on "An act donating public lands to the several States
and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agricultural and the
mechanic arts"); 43 H.R.JouRNAL 82, 87-88, 91 (1847) (recording PresidentJames
K. Polk's veto message on "An act to provide for continuing certain works in the
Territory of Wisconsin, and for other purposes"); 39 H.R. JouRNAL 1081, 1081
(1844) (recording PresidentJohn Tyler's veto message on "An act making appropriations for the improvement of certain harbors and rivers").
20. See 55 H.R. JouRNAL 501, 506 (1859) (rejecting contention that money
raised by sale of public lands is not subject to limitations of Constitution).
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natural intendment would be, that as the Constitution confined
Congress to well-defined specific powers, the funds placed at
their command, whether in land or money, should be appropriated to the performance of the duties corresponding with these
powers. If not, a government has been created with all its other
powers carefully limited, but without any limitation with respect
21
to the public lands.
In addition to the positions taken by the Founders and the early presidents, strong evidence for interpreting the Spending Clause as being limited to the general rather than local welfare comes from the structure of
the enumerated powers outlined in the Constitution. The enumerated
powers given to Congress in the rest of Article I, Section 8 were themselves
limited to matters that required national rather than local legislation. For
example, early in the constitutional convention, Roger Sherman proposed
that Congress should have power to legislate "in all cases which may concern the common interests of the Union: but not to interfere with the
government of the individual States in any matters of internal police which
respect the government of such States only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is not concerned." 22 Gunning Bedford proposed
giving Congress the power "to legislate in all cases for the general interests
of the Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent."23 The proposals by Sherman and Gunning, and others like them,
were referred to the Committee of Detail, which on August 6, 1787 gave
substance to the proposals by reporting back a list of enumerated powers. 24 This list would eventually become those Article I, Section 8 powers
designed to further the common interests or general welfare of the nation
without interfering unnecessarily with the internal police powers of the
states. Thus, the limitations implicit in the very idea of the enumerated
powers doctrine paralleled the "general welfare" limitation in the Spending Clause.
The Supreme Court has also at times recognized that the Spending
Clause is limited to the general rather than local welfare. In Butler, the
Court held that "[w] hile... the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines
are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of Section 8 which
bestow and define the legislative powers of the Congress."2 5 Though the
Court rejected the long-standing Madisonian position that the power to
spend for the "general welfare" only authorized Congress to spend to further other enumerated powers, the Court nevertheless concluded that the
21. Id.

22. Journal (July 17, 1787), in 2
21, 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

23. Id.
24. See Madison (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 THE RECoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 22, at 177, 181-83 (listing enumerated powers of Congress).
25. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
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"General Welfare" Clause imposed another limitation on Congress's
spending power, namely, that the purpose of the spending "must be 'general, and not local."26 Justice Stone, in dissent, shared the majority's view
that the Constitution limited federal spending to national as opposed to
merely local purposes. 2 7 "The power to tax and spend," he wrote, "is not
without constitutional restraints. One restriction is that the purpose must
be truly national." 28 The Court then invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act as exceeding this textual limit,29 demonstrating that the interpretive gloss that has subsequently been placed on the Butler decision is
really more of a matte finish serving to obscure rather than reflect the
actual holding of the case.
In recent years, several members of the Supreme Court have recognized the limits on the Spending Clause, as originally conceived. In her
dissent in South Dakota v. Dole,3 0 for example, Justice O'Connor warned:
If the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of
the general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources
of the Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives
"power to the Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the
states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the whole peo31
ple, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed.
Justice O'Connor emphasized in Dole that this "was not the Framers' plan
32
and it is not the meaning of the Spending Clause."
In two recent concurrences, Justice Thomas has also acknowledged
the possibility that various pieces of federal legislation may exceed the
Spending Clause, even when combined with the Necessary and Proper
Clause. In Sabri v. United States,3 3 for example, Justice Thomas questioned
whether a prosecution under the federal bribery statute for a bribe of a
local elected official in a non-federally funded program was plainly
adapted to further Congress's power under the Spending Clause and
therefore a valid, necessary and proper means to advance a legitimate,
constitutionally-permissible Spending Clause end. 34 Finally, just this past
26. See id. at 66-67 (discussing various and specific limitations on Congress's
spending power).
27. See id. at 87 (Stone, J., dissenting) (stating that power to spend has constraints such that it should be truly national and not avenue used to usurp state
control).
28. Id. (Stone, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 68 (reasoning that Agricultural Adjustment Act exceeds powers
of federal government by providing "means to an unconstitutional end").
30. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
31. Id. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78).
32. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
33. 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
34. Id. at 610-14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning scope of Necessary
and Proper Clause given by majority opinion).
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Term in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 35 Justice Thomas repeatedly noted that the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act "may well exceed
Congress' authority under .

.

. the Spending Clause."3 6 He recognized,

however, that the Court properly declined to consider the issue because it
was outside the scope of the question present and was not addressed by
37
the court below.
Justices O'Connor and Thomas are correct: as originally understood,
the Spending Clause was limited to spending that benefited national
rather than local interests, whether that limitation was defined exclusively
by the text of the General Welfare Clause itself, as Hamilton believed, or
by resort to the other enumerated powers delegated to Congress as neces38
sary for national rather than merely local purposes, as Madison believed.
The trend of recent scholarship supports this view. In addition to my own
prior work on the subject, 39 for example, Professor Robert Natelson has
noted that "the goal of the General Welfare Clause was to limit all congressional taxation and spending to general interest, as opposed to local or
special interest, purposes." 40 Additionally, Professor Laurence Clause
wrote that "[t] he 'general Welfare,' for promotion of which the Constitution was created, is the welfare of the whole United States. It is not an
abstraction that authorizes any spending which benefits anyone within the
United States." 41 Finally, Professor Jeffrey Renz concluded in a comprehensive 1999 article that "Congress can tax for national, but not for local,
purposes."
III.

42

UNCONDITIONAL FEDERAL GRANTS TO LOCAL EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS PRIMARILY SERVE LOCAL
RATHER THAN NATIONAL PURPOSES

The second step in the inquiry requires us to assess whether unconditional grants of federal funds to local institutions of higher education qual-

35. 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005).
36. Id. at 2125 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Sabri, 541 U.S. at 613
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
37. See id. at 2127 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Ohio's Spending Clause and
Commerce Clause challenges ... may well have merit.").
38. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 362, 386-87 (1792) (recording Madison describing
limits of Congress's spending power); Hamilton, supra note 12, at 446-47 (explaining Spending Clause intent of founders).
39. SeeJohn C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 63, 87 (2001) ("For the eighty-five years of our nation's history...
the language of 'general welfare' was viewed as a limitation on the powers of Congress, not as a grant of plenary power.").
40. Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay
in Original Understanding,52 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 49 (2003).
41. Laurence Clause, "Uniform Throughout the United States": Limits on Taxing as
Limits on Spending, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 517, 540 (2001).
42. Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President'sParamour):An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 of
the United States Constitution, 33J. MARSHALL L. REv. 81, 127 (1999).
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ify as a valid exercise of Congress's power to tax and spend for the
"general welfare," as originally understood. Only then can the Solomon
Amendment's conditions on that spending be assessed properly.
To draw the line between spending programs that are considered to
be for the general welfare (and hence constitutional) and those viewed as
primarily for the local welfare (and hence unconstitutional), one should
look to the views of the founders and our earliest presidents regarding
which programs they believed would violate the Spending Clause and
which were permissible. Most of the rejected programs dealt with grants
to the states for internal improvements, whether for roads, rivers, harbors
or canals. 43 Harbor improvements on the seaward side of ports of entry,
however, were found to be acceptable because such improvements directly
benefited the entire coastal trade. 44 Loans and stock purchases for private
companies were rejected, while refunds of commercial duties were allowed. 45 And most directly relevant to the inquiry at hand, grants of land
for insane asylums and agricultural colleges were also rejected as being
unconstitutional. 4 6 The line, therefore, must be between spending that
primarily benefits the nation as a whole versus spending that primarily
benefits local interests (and perhaps collaterally benefits national interests
as well). Dredging a river in Georgia above the point of navigability primarily benefits the people of Georgia, while erecting lighthouses on coastal
47
waterways broadly benefits the entire national intercoastal trade.
In the F.A.LR. case currently pending before the Supreme Court,
therefore, the Court should first determine whether federal spending on
43. See, e.g., Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 53, 54 (1789) (terminating payment
for upkeep on harbor installations unless ceded to federal government); 43 H.R.
JouRNAAL 82, 83-86 (1847) (stating President Polk's objections to disparate spending on internal harbors and rivers); 28 H.R. JouRNAL 9, 29-30 (1834) (recording
President Jackson stating that "the constitution did not confer upon [Congress]
the power to authorize the construction of ordinary roads and canals within the
limits of a State"); 5 H.R. JOuRNAL 466, 469 (1806) (noting President Jefferson
concluding that congressional spending on roads, rivers and canals was not authorized and thus constitutional amendment was required).
44. See 28 H.R. JouRNAL 9, 31-32 (1834) (recording President Andrew Jackson's veto message on "An act to improve the navigation of the Wabash river").
45. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 362, 397-98 (1792) (discussing aid to cod fisheries
through refunds of duties); 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1685, 1686 (1790) (noting debate
concerning propriety of government loans to individuals); see also 28 H.R. JOuRNAL
9, 29-30 (1834) (providing President Jackson's explanation of objection to government stock purchases in local railroad).
46. See 45 S. JouRNAL 361, 361-69 (1854) (recording President Franklin
Pierce's veto message on "An act making a grant of public lands to the several
States for the benefit of indigent insane persons"); President James Buchanan to

House of Representatives (Feb. 24, 1859), in 5 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 543, 543-50 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)
(recording President James Buchanan veto message on "An act donating public
lands to the several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agricultural and the mechanic arts").
47. See Act ofJuly 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 53, 54 (1789) (stating that lighthouses will
benefit national interest).
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institutions of higher education primarily benefits national or local interests. A look to history shows that the original understanding of the Spending Clause did not view such spending as being for the general welfare. In
1806, for example, President Thomas Jefferson proposed an amendment
to the Constitution that would allow Congress to spend its surplus for "the
great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such
other objects of public improvement as it may be thought proper to add to
the constitutional enumeration of the federal powers." 48 He felt that such
an amendment was necessary "because the objects now recommended are
not among those enumerated in the Constitution, and to which it permits
the public moneys to be applied." 49 In 1859, President Buchanan vetoed,
lands to the several states for
as unconstitutional, an act donating public
50
the establishment of agricultural colleges.
In addition to this and other historical evidence that unadorned and
unconditioned spending on higher education violates the Spending
Clause by primarily benefiting local interests, contemporary cases continue to emphasize the local nature of education. In the landmark case of
Brown v. Board of Education,5 1 the Supreme Court recognized that "educa-

tion is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." 52 This view has been repeatedly reinforced in the decades since
that case was decided. In Epperson v. Arkansas,53 the Court reaffirmed: "By
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of
state and local authorities." 54 In Milliken v. Bradley,55 the Court noted that
"[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
57
56
And in United States v. Lopez,
control over the operation of schools."
the Court noted that "education [is an area] where States historically have
been sovereign." 58 Even if Congress were to fund institutions in every
state, this aggregation of several local benefits would still not be funding
for the general, national welfare.
IV.

CONGRESS'S POWER TO RAISE AND SUPPORT ARMIES

Our examination of the original understanding of the Spending
Clause shows that, as originally conceived, the Clause does not authorize
Congress to provide unconditional federal funding to institutions of
higher education. Nevertheless, such funding may still be authorized
48. 5 H.R. JouRNAL 466, 469 (1806).
49. Id.

50. See Buchanan, supra note 46, at 543-50 (declaring act unconstitutional).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Id. at 104.
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 741.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 564.
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under some other power granted to Congress in the Constitution. Funding of higher education under the restrictions of the Solomon Amendment is still permissible under Congress's power to raise and support
armies, for example.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly and correctly recognized that
"[t] he constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to
59
make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping."
In its opinion considering the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit presumed
that "the United States has a vital interest in having a system for acquiring
talented military lawyers." 60 The national interest in educating prospective soldiers has long been a motivating factor in federal funding of education. Historically, the first federal funding of private institutions of higher
education came through government sponsorship of military officer training programs at private schools during World War I and World War II. It
was only after this inroad that peacetime funding of private institutions
61
began.
If the education of future soldiers is to be successful, the government
must have the ability to recruit the students whose education is being subsidized. In this context, the Solomon Amendment is not a separate restriction or penalty imposed on a broader funding program, but instead is a
tool to condition spending for the purposes for which it was authorized.
The Amendment guarantees that these federal programs funding higher
education really do go to help raise and support armies. This is why Judge
Aldisert was right in his dissent to say that the Solomon Amendment was
"not only authorized . . . but commanded by" Congress's power to raise
62
and support armies.
Nor does the Solomon Amendment serve as an unconstitutional condition, 63 restricting (as has been alleged) the freedom of speech or association of those who choose to accept federal funding. Indeed, just the
opposite is true; once the Solomon Amendment is seen as a necessary
component of ensuring that federal funding of higher education goes to
59. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (citing Lichter v.
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755-58 (1948)) (ruling on extent of Congress's
power).
60. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld (FA.LR.), 390

F.3d 219, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting United States' interest).
61. See H. Kathryn Merrill, The Encroachment of the Federal Government into Private Institutionsof HigherEducation, 1994 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 63, 64-65 (1994) (tracing
rise of federal funding).
62. F.A.LR., 390 F.3d at 250 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing Amendment's
validity).
63. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides that the government
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally
protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). On the other hand, however, "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
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support the military, it becomes clear that it is perfectly constitutional. By
virtue of the Solomon Amendment, Congress "is not denying a benefit to
anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the
purposes for which they were authorized." 64 In Rust v. Sullivan,65 the Supreme Court upheld a restriction barring federal family planning services
funds from being used in programs providing abortion counseling. 66 In
United States v. American Library Ass'n,67 the Supreme Court likewise upheld

a statutory requirement that libraries accepting federal funds agree to
block obscene Internet sites. 68 In such cases, the unconstitutional condi-

tions doctrine does not apply because "the Government is not denying a
benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent
for the purposes for which they were authorized." 69 The key, then, is determining whether the Solomon Amendment is a component of the funding programs that was put in place to ensure that the money was spent for
the authorized purposes; or whether the Solomon Amendment is a separate denial of a benefit (or imposition of a penalty) that takes away funds
from some recipients for reasons unconnected with the government's purposes for providing the funding.
As described above, the most valid basis for federal funding of local
higher education is Congress's power to raise and support armies. By permitting funding only to those institutions that allow military recruiters on
campus, the Solomon Amendment serves to ensure that the federal
money is really going to help educate potential soldiers. As such, the
Amendment is not imposing a penalty but simply requires institutions receiving public funds to spend those funds "for the purposes for which they
were authorized." 70 Strike down the Solomon Amendment and the entire
federal education spending edifice is constitutionally suspect under the
original understanding of the Constitution's spending power.

64. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (explaining operation of unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
65. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
66. See id. at 203 (holding that restriction was valid use of congressional
power).
67. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
68. See id. at 211 (holding unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not
render statute invalid).
69. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (reasoning that restriction is valid because it does
not condition funding on recipient foregoing certain activity).
70. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 196 (explaining why funding restriction is valid).
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